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INTRODUCTION
On page 2 of his Second Brief, William Anthony Kraatz ("Kraatz") sets forth a
number of incredible claims, which are then repeated throughout his argument. Kraatz
claims "the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Kraatz's motion on March 26,
2001." Nothing could be further from the truth. The trial court's Minute Entry Ruling
(R. 4773) stated a "hearing" was scheduled for March 26, 2001 at 9:00 a.m., not a
trial or even an evidentiary hearing.

Counsel for Heritage Imports ("Heritage"),

consistent with their practice, inquired of the court clerk about the nature of that
hearing, and, accordingly, were not surprised when Judge Frederick announced:
THE COURT: Very well. Let me indicate for the record,
counsel, I have reviewed the respective submissions in these
matters, both in support of and in opposition to the motion, and I
will therefore necessarily limit the presentation per side to 20
minutes.
(R. 5059, p. 2).
The hearing concerned not only attorney fees, but all of Kraatz's damage claims.
Kraatz's counsel did not even argue attorney fees in his opening argument. (See
generally, id. at pp. 5-15). Instead, counsel focused on the "big issues" of damages.
(Id. at pp. 6, 11, 12 & 14). In fact, the only mention by counsel for Kraatz of attorney
fees was to incorrectly assure the trial court his claim for current fees only represented
efforts as to the single cause of action upon which Kraatz prevailed. (R. 5059, pp. 2122).

1
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Kraatz further incredibly claims Heritage "did not contest the reasonableness of
Kraatz's attorney fees incurred on appeal" (Second Brief, p.2) "did not contest the
adequacy of the findings and conclusions" (Id., p. 4 & p. 12, fn. 2), "never offered
any specific objection to Kraatz's post-remand fees" (Id. at p. 13), and "never objected
in the district court to the amount of the fee reductions." (Id. at pp. 19-20). Heritage
filed a Memorandum in Opposition with numerous pages detailing objections to
Kraatz's requested fees. (R. 4635-4641). Heritage's proposed Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, which again objected to the claimed fees (R. 4859, 487476), stated: "After considering all relevant factors, Plaintiff is entitled to an attorney
fee award of $41,372.85," representing one-third of the principal recovered.

(R.

4876). Given the abbreviated nature of the proceedings in the court below, it is neither
fair or reasonable for Kraatz to make these claims. Additional analysis of these claims
is set forth immediately below in Point I.

ARGUMENT
POINTI
HERITAGE CHALLENGED THE
ATTORNEY FEES REQUEST BELOW
Throughout his Second Brief, Kraatz argues the "essential" nature of his
attorney fees request is unrebuttably set forth in counsel's affidavits. Counsel's
affidavits, however, are only valid insofar as they lay foundation regarding the amount
2
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of attorney fees (hourly rates, hours, task description), not as to the legal conclusions
that the amount of attorney fees were reasonable, necessary or justified—as that
determination is for judicial review. A court is not bound by counsel's self-serving
affidavits, even when no motion to strike or counter-affidavits are filed. See Beckstrom
v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1978) ("Even though [the reasonableness of the
attorney fee] evidence is undisputed, the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to
accept such self-interested testimony whole cloth and make such an award."); N.A.R.,
Inc. v. Marcek, 2000 UT App 300, f l l , 13 P.3d 612 (holding "[t]he trial court is not
bound by the fees requested in the claimant's affidavit. . . . "

"Simply put, the trial

court's award need not incorporate the fees requested by the claimant.").1
Although Heritage did not and does not object to the hourly rates charged by
Kraatz's attorneys, Heritage's Memorandum in opposition filed with the trial court
addressed the unreasonableness and excessiveness of the claimed attorney fees request
at length.2 Counter affidavits are not the only way to challenge attorney fees. The party
requesting attorney fees has the burden of proving its request is reasonable. "One who
seeks an award of attorney fees, therefore, has the burden of producing evidence to
1

As the N.A.R. Court also observed: "The trial court's award of reasonable attorney
fees must, however, 'be supported by evidence in the record'." 2000 UT App at 1 10,
N.A.R., 13P.3dat614.
2
At the hearing before the trial court, counsel for Heritage also addressed the
excessive nature of post-remand attorney fees. (R. 5059, p. 19). A vivid example of
this excessive nature is Kraatz's 6.10 hours and $1,076.50 for researching alternative
CPI adjustments to damages, where it was not provided for under the contract and not
presented at trial or even in his first appeal.
3
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buttress the requested award." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah
1992). The opposing party then can challenge the fee request by affidavit or brief.
Walton v. Massanari, 177 F. Supp.2d 359, 361 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("The objecting party
has the burden to challenge, through affidavit or brief . . ."). Heritage challenged
Kraatz's fee request in its Memorandum and proposed Amended Findings and
Conclusions opposing damages on remand.
Heritage's Memorandum addressed the excesses and unreasonableness of
Kraatz's fee because it: (1) did not allocated between successful and unsuccessful
claims against Heritage, (2) must be reduced for failed claims against O. Bryan
Wilkinson ("B. Wilkinson") and Jeff J. Wilkinson ("J. Wilkinson"), (3) was not
reduced for time spent pursuing extracontractual claims, (4) requested excessive fees,
(5) should be sharply reduced for failure to accept reasonable settlement offers in
excess of what the trial court eventually awarded, and (6) because it did not meet all the
factors required under Utah law, including consideration for the results obtained. (R.
4635-4641). In fact, in direct response to the issues raised in Heritage's Opposing
Memorandum, Kraatz conceded certain fee reductions.

(R. 4756, 4970-71).

Obviously, Heritage raised relevant and specific issues that persuaded Kraatz to
recognize some excessive and unreasonable time entries in his fee request. Given the
objections and analysis contained in Heritage's Memorandum and Amended Findings
and Conclusions, Kraatz's argument that no objection to attorney fees was made by

4
.

/

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Heritage falls flat.
Contrary to Kraatz's assertions, counsel for Heritage did not stipulate to the
reasonableness of the attorney fee requests, nor did Kraatz's counsel offer to take the
stand concerning their fee affidavits.

Rather, Heritage's counsel only stipulated to

foundation of certain supplemental exhibits, some of which were sprung on Heritage at
the hearing itself. There was no stipulation as to Affidavits filed by Kraatz's counsel.
(R. 4811). What actually occurred at that hearing regarding the stipulation was as
follows:
THE COURT: What are the exhibits designated?
* * *

MR.LINEBAUGH: Attorney's fees supplemented through today
and beyond. That's just a quick schedule that I can put in and
testify about. We'd like to put in the original attorney's fee
agreement that was entered into between the client and Jardine,
Linebaugh & Dunn. Then there was a supplemental agreement that
was entered into after Jardine, Linebaugh & Dunn dissolved, and
both firms ended up being the representative of the plaintiff. We
would want to put that in.
We also wanted to put in the briefs that went up on appeal to
show you the quality of the work we've done on the appeal,
because that's an issue in this matter. Then we finally, because of
these adjustments and fezes [sic] and so on, to help you, we've
prepared another summary of the total amount of principal we're
asking for, including all of these attorney fee supplements. We
thought that would be helpful to you.
Also, one other thing which was the - not only the briefs
that went up on appeal but our resistance to the writ of cert on
appeal. We just wanted to put all of those in so the record is
complete, and you can review them at your leisure, and by way of
foundation I can put myself on with respect to my time since
March 4th. Mr. Zundel can give you a foundation to all of the rest
5
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of these, but—
THE COURT: I assume, Mr. Winder, you would concede to the
proffer being made, that if Mr. Linebaugh were to take the stand—
MR. WINDER: Of course.
THE COURT: He would testify that the services rendered were
reasonable, and in his opinion, required under the circumstances.
All right. Then the documents—and you can have them marked
later (inaudible) may be received, counsel. (R. 5059, p. 3-4).
Thus, counsel for Heritage only stipulated to foundation for the certain
supplemental exhibits that were sprung at the hearing. (R. 4811). Kraatz's assertion
Heritage is bound to pay all of his requested attorney fees because Heritage did not file
a counteraffidavit or call witnesses attacking Kraatz's fee affidavits in the brief hearing
set forth above is simply wrong.
POINT n

KRAATZ'S CAUSES OF ACTION DO NOT OVERLAP
Kraatz cites Brown v. Richards, 1999 UT App 109, 978 P.2d 470, cert denied,
994 P.2d 1271, for the proposition that Heritage is responsible for his attorney fees
spent on unsuccessful causes of action because the elements of proof overlap or are
inextricably tied together. In Brown, the overlapping claims were breach of warranty,
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, and the defense of failure to substantially
perform. Id. at 475. The Brown court, however, concluded that rescission was not
closely related to the other claims and disallowed attorney fees for rescission.
6
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In the instant case, Kraatz brought claims against Heritage, B. Wilkinson, and J.
Wilkinson for breach of contract,3 breach of duty of good faith & fair dealing,4 alter
ego,5 inducement of breach,6 and interference with prospective business relationships.7
The breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing have
similar elements that overlap.

However, those elements are not inextricably tied

together with the tort causes of action for alter ego, inducement of breach and
interference with prospective business relationships.
Alter ego does not address whether a party has failed to fulfill an obligation. It
3

Breach of Contract. The plaintiff must prove the defendant breached an obligation
under the contract by failing to [describe performance required of the defendant].
MUJI 26.22.
4
Duty of Good Faith. Whether expressed or not, every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect to dealings between the parties.
The parties to a contract must deal fairly and honestly with each other. MUJI 26.30.
5
Alter Ego. [I]n order to disregard a corporate entity, there must be a concurrence of
two circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the
corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance
of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result
would follow. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constrs., 761 P.2d 42, 46-47 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
6
Inducement of Breach. No cases adopting a cause of action for inducement of breach
could be found in Utah. Tennessee recognizes this cause of action and requires: "The
plaintiff must prove that there was a legal contract, that the wrongdoer had sufficient
knowledge of the contract, and she intended to induce its breach. Further, that the
wrongdoer acted maliciously, and the contract was, in fact, breached, and the alleged
act was the proximate cause of the breach, and damages resulted from that breach."
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
7
Interference with Prospective Business Relationships. To find interference the plaintiff
must prove the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or
potential economic relations, for an improper purpose or by improper means, thereby
causing economic injury to the plaintiff. MUJI 19.1.
7
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concerns whether there is a "unity or ownership" such that the corporate veil should be
pierced to avoid sanctioning a fraud, injustice or inequity, requiring a different
constellation of facts to establish. Additionally, if it even exists in Utah, inducement of
breach requires proof of malicious intent and action, which goes far beyond what is
required for breach of contract. Besides, inducement of breach and interference with
prospective business relationships are not even applicable in this case. Leigh Furniture
& Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982) ("It is settled that one party to a
contract cannot be liable for the tort of interference with contract for inducing a breach
by himself or the other contracting party."). Thus, either the tort causes of action
pursued by Kraatz do not "overlap" or are not "inextricably tied" with the breach of
contract causes of action, or they do not apply to this case. All fees in pursuit of the
tort theories and against the individual defendants should be disallowed.
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55-56 (Utah 1998)8 involved a suit for breach of
contract and other noncontract, tortious interference claims. The contract at issue in
Foote included a provision for attorney fees, and the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of
fees for the breach of contract claim, as well as the other tort claims. The trial court
awarded all requested fees. On review, the Utah Supreme Court noted the attorney fee
affidavit did not properly categorize between the successful breach of contract claim
and unsuccessful tort claims. Because the contract only provided for attorney fees for
8

Foote was cited in Heritage's Opening Brief. Kraatz chose not to mention it in his
Second Brief.
8
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enforcing the contract, the Court disallowed the attorney fees for time spent pursuing
the "tortious interference" claims. Foote held:
The language of the contract does not permit assessing fees
against the [defendant] that relate to the non-contract claims
against either [defendant]. These tort-based actions were not
brought to 'remedy' a default in the purchase agreement by the
'defaulting party,' as required by the contract, but to recover the
alleged improper profit of [defendants]. It would violate the
contract to require the defaulting party to pay attorney fees
accrued in pursuing these claims when the work done did not
tangibly relate to the breach of contract claim as well.
* * *

'When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he
should not have a free ride to assert claims against other defendants
with the expectation that the target defendant will end up paying all
attorney's fees,' even when those claims factually relate to claims
for which the plaintiff may be entitled to attorney fees.
Id. at 55-56 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, even if there is some overlap or
factual relationship among causes of action, attorney fees should not be awarded where it
creates an incentive for attorneys to pursue tenuous or meritless claims in order to recover
larger amounts of attorney fees.
POINT m
HERITAGE DID NOT CAUSE
KRAATZ TO INCUR EXCESSIVE FEES
On pages 7 and 8 of his Second Brief, Kraatz attempts to justify his enormous
attorney fees by citing Heritage's discovery failure, unmerited accusations, aggressive

9
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defense, (arguing "refusal" is equivalent to "failure" in interpreting the contract), and
unfriendly witnesses.9 Kraatz then proceeds on pages 9 and 10 to attempt to justify the
numerous depositions taken and the thousands of documents and financial records
examined. However, all of these excuses are without merit.
Kraatz's citation to an order compelling discovery is misplaced. The motion
involved Heritage's previous counsel and no award of attorney fees was ever ordered
by the trial court. (R. 224). Even if it were, Kraatz devoted 34.50 hours ($3,253.50)
to the matter. (R. 238). Hardly a justification for his enormous fees.
Kraatz's time for his nine-page motion to compel was as large as it was, 34.5
hours, because a majority of the data Kraatz requested concerned extracontractual
damages, tort claims, or claims unrelated to the breach of contract claim: Jazz tickets
(R. 66), alter ego (R. 66-70), bad faith (R. 67, 69, 70), personal and corporate
financial records (R. 67 & 69) for bookkeeping adjustments that were rejected by the
trial court (R. 4997), and employment manual benefits that were also not included in
Kraatz's contract (R. 237). Kraatz should recover none of these fees because he failed
to prevail on any of those claims.

9

Kraatz's claims in his Second Brief are taken almost verbatim from paragraph 25 of
counsel's Affidavit (R. 5110), clearly demonstrating the argumentative and conclusory
nature of that Affidavit. It adds nothing for Kraatz to then cite to this Affidavit as
"record" authority for his claims. Similarly, paragraphs 27 and 38 of counsel's
Affidavit (R. 5111, 5115) do nothing to advance the claims on pages 9 and 10 discussed
in the text above.
10
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Further, Kraatz's counsel was billing $85 per hour for Mr. Devashrayee's time
for the motion to compel, but bumped up his hourly rate to $90 per hour in the request
on remand.10 A rate hike should not be allowed after the fact.
Heritage's "aggressiveness" simply involved defending against the unfounded
and overreaching claims made against B. Wilkinson, J. Wilkinson, and Heritage. Even
though Kraatz ultimately prevailed on the breach of contract action, he failed in proving
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing against Heritage, alter ego, inducement of
breach and interference with prospective business relations against B. Wilkinson, and
inducement of breach and interference with prospective business relations against J.
Wilkinson. Heritage merely defended what began as a $3.5 million dollar claim to
what was finally determined to be worth $124,118.56 in principal.
Heritage did take the position "refusal" was tantamount to "failure" in
interpreting the contract. Out of the total of $225,210.36 in trial fees, $130,557.75
(58%) was exclusively devoted to "Nullification of Heritage's Tor Cause' Defenses."
(Kraatz's Second Brief, p. 5). Kraatz acknowledged he made no fee reductions here.
{Id. at p. 20).
provisions."

However, this Court characterized the contract as having "clear

(Memorandum Decision, p. 2). If the provisions were that "clear,"

couldn't this issue have been handled in the trial court by motion? Clearly, it should

10

The time entry on 04/29/93 for JJD contained in the motion to compel indicates a
dollar amount of $620.50 (R. 237). However, the same entry in the fee request to the
trial court has a dollar amount of $657.00 (R. 4359).
11
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have been handled for a fraction of $130,557.75 in attorney fees.
No citation to the record or any example was given Kraatz in support of his
claimed "unmerited accusations." Nor was any reasoning set forth as to Kraatz's claim
of difficult witnesses resulted in extensive legal services. Accordingly, Heritage is
unable to meaningfully respond to these claims.
Kraatz argues his attorney fees were so high because he needed to sort through
thousands of documents (including those regarding extracontractual claims such as
warranty income, Jazz tickets, tennis lessons, Christmas bonuses) over a period of
several years to defend against claims of misfeasance and establish the true value of the
dealership after making adjustment for B. Wilkinson's personal use of corporate funds.
The trial court's findings rejected bookkeeping "adjustments" urged by Kraatz. (R.
4995-97). Heritage's bookkeeping had always been accepted by Honda, USA (Id.),
and this standard was expressly provided for in the parties' contract. (Ex. 38, p. 7).
(R. 4996-97). Kraatz's time and effort in "adjusting" the accounting to his benefit,
cannot, therefore, support an award of fees, especially since he failed to raise this issue
in his initial appeal. His claims of misfeasance must also fail for the reasons discussed
concerning the alleged "aggressive" defense.
Because Heritage designated 30 potential witnesses, is it reasonable for Kraatz
to have deposed 17 of them and only call 5 at trial (see p. 29 of Heritage's Opening
Brief) in a case where this Court, in its initial opinion, found the contract provisions

12
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"clear"? (Memorandum Decision, p. 2). This Court in Brown v. Richards, supra,
1999 UT App at f 30, 978 P.2d at 476, (quoting Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors,
997 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) held:
We have made it clear that 'there is a point at which thorough and
diligent litigation efforts become overkill.' At such point, 'the
district court must disallow claims for excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary charges/
Counsel for Kraatz overworked the case to pursue claims that did not apply
beyond the breach of contract claim. Kraatz should not be rewarded by receiving
attorney fees for excessive, unsupported and unfounded claims.

POINTIV
KRAATZ'S ATTORNEY
FEES WERE EXCESSIVE
AND UNREASONABLE IN LIGHT OF:
1. The Results Obtained. In response to Heritage's argument that attorney fees
should rarely exceed the principal recovered, Kraatz claims there is no supporting Utah
caselaw.

Numerous Utah cases hold that in awarding attorney fees, consideration

should be given to the "result obtained."

See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d

985, 991 (Utah 1988), and Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985)11 (both
of which were both cited to the trial court). Considering Kraatz prevailed on only one
11

While Cabrera, supra, 694 P.2d at 625, held: "The amount of damages awarded in
a case does not place a necessary limit on amount of attorneys fees that can be
awarded," the "results attained" is clearly a factor for consideration.
13
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of his seven causes of action and obtained a principal judgment of $124,118.56 after
seeking $3.5 million, Kraatz should not recover all of the fees he requested. Kraatz
should recover no more than one-third of the principal recovery or $41,372.85, since
he had agreed to a one-third contingency fee.

(Plaintiffs Supplemental Ex. 2, R.

4811).
Kraatz attempts to distinguish Diamond D Enterprises USA, Inc. v. Steinsvaag,
979 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993), claiming it is the
amount in controversy that may limit recovery of attorney fees. However, Kraatz
failed to recognize Diamond D holding that it is "the amount reasonably in
controversy" which can serve as a ceiling to attorney fees. Id. at 19-20. (emphasis
supplied). The amount reasonably in controversy in the case at bar was not $3.5
million, but rather, something more like $124,118.56 as was awarded by the trial
court.
2. Multiple Attorneys. The contract called for reasonable attorney fees. Kraatz
bears the burden of proof to support an award of attorney fees. See Cottonwood Mall
Co., supra, 830 P.2d at 268. The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden "to
prove and establish the reasonableness of each dollar, each hour, above zero." Mares
v. Credit Bureau, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1986). "A district court should
approach this reasonableness inquiry 'much as a senior partner in a private law firm
would review the reports of subordinate attorneys when billing clients.'" Robinson v.
14
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City ofEdmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998).
Kraatz admits to using multiple attorneys throughout the case for "repetition,
rethinking, brainstorming and experimentation" because of the alleged complexity of
the case. (Kraatz's Second Brief, p. 8; R. 5113). How many hourly paying clients
would pay multiple attorneys for "repetition" and "experimentation"? Repetition and
experimentation by definition should be disallowed as unreasonable and excessive.
Further, as already noted, this Court characterized the contract at issue in this case as
having "clear provisions" (Memorandum Decision, p. 2), and therefore, no repetition,
rethinking, brainstorming or experimentation should have been necessary.
Other jurisdictions disallow use of multiple attorneys as excessive and
unreasonable. "If the same task is performed by more than one lawyer, multiple
compensation should be denied." Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir.
1983). Fees for more than one attorney should not be awarded unless justified to the
Court. Id. at 554, n.4. This Court should also disallow fees incurred by multiple
attorneys on Kraatz's legal team.
3. Settlement Offers. Kraatz argues the case of Greenwich Film Productions,
S.A. v. DRG Records, Inc., 40 USPQ.2d 1223, 1996 WL 502336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
cited by Heritage, is not relevant because it is not a Utah case. However, Kraatz has
not cited any Utah cases that disallow consideration of settlement offers when
evaluating attorney fees. Nonetheless, the reasoning supporting consideration of such
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information is sound, i.e., attorneys shouldn't be rewarded for being unreasonable and
trying to make a case into something it is not.
Kraatz claims at the time Heritage offered to settle for $308,000, on July 15,
1993 (R. 4682), his claim was $3,500,000 because he had not had the opportunity to
mitigate his damages.

However, Kraatz was always under the duty to mitigate

damages. Any damages Kraatz would be entitled to recover under the contract must be
reduced by "amounts actually earned by the employee during that period or amounts he
reasonably could have earned in other available employment of a like nature."
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah 1981).
Immediately after being terminated, Kraatz, began receiving a salary from a new
employer nearly equivalent to what he would have made at Heritage.12 Thus, Kraatz's
assertion the settlement offer was made before he had been able to mitigate his damages
is flawed.
The real reason Kraatz failed to accept the initial offer to settle for $308,000 was
that he and his counsel had unreasonable expectations about this lawsuit. That behavior
should not be rewarded. A litigant should not be able to assert illusory claims, as was
done here, in an effort to turn a small case into a windfall for his legal team. As noted
12

From September 1992 through December 1992, Kraatz actually earned $35,183.86
from other sources, while he would have made only $32,000 at Heritage during that
same period. For the year 1993, Kraatz had received salary from new employment of
$87,560.44, which was $8,439.50 less than what he would have received at Heritage.
(R. 4080, 4143). Clearly this case was never worth $3.5 million to a reasonable
person.
16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in Foote, supra, 962 P.2d at 56:
'When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he should
not have a free ride to assert claims against other defendants with the
expectation that the target defendant will end up paying all attorney's
fees,' even when those claims factually relate to claims for which the
plaintiff may be entitled to attorney fees.
4. Failure to Allocate Fees. Kraatz argues on page 22 of his Second Brief that
Heritage raised issues for the first time on appeal, i.e., Judge Frederick's reversal rate,
travel time, and two or more attorneys on the same task. Heritage's Memorandum in
the trial court addressed Kraatz's failure to apportion his attorney fees and refusal to
withdraw his request for time spent on inappropriate tasks. (R. 4635-43). It is true
Heritage only provided certain examples of Kraatz's failure to allocate in its
Memorandum. However, as noted under 2. Multiple Attorneys, supra, Kraatz bore the
burden of proof to justify the reasonableness of each hour. Heritage expected the trial
court would allocate more than a few minutes for its assessment of attorney fees, which
additional time could have been used, inter alia, to detail Kraatz's numerous allocation
problems.
Heritage's Appellate Brief contained more detail than the Memorandum because
Heritage was obligated to marshal the evidence on appeal.

Contrary to Kraatz's

assertion, Heritage cited several cases that reject attorney fees for time spent
determining the reversal rate of the trial judge or appellate court (in this case 41.60
hours or $4,596), time spent on travel, and time spent by two or more attorneys on a
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task. (See Heritage's Opening Brief, pp. 49-54).
An award of attorney fees based upon a contractual right must be allocated to the
underlying contractual claim. The Utah Supreme Court has declared:
a party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and
fees expended for '(1) successful claims for which there may be an
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there
would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims
been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney fees.' Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998)
(citation omitted) (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d
266, 268 (Utah 1992)). In addition, 4[w]hile a trial court may, in
its discretion, deny fees altogether for failure to allocate, it may not
award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been
allocated as to separate claims and/or parties.' Valcarce v.
Fitgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998).
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, 2002 UT 68, f 56.
Further, claims must also be categorized according to the various opposing parties. See
Foote, supra, 962P.2d at 55.
Thus, Kraatz's failure to categorize his claims as required by Utah law requires
reversal of the fees awarded.

Time spent pursuing tort causes of action and

extracontractual damages such as warranty income, Jazz tickets, tennis lessons, and
Christmas bonuses should all be completely disallowed. Additionally, Kraatz's fee
award should be sharply reduced for failure to adequately reduce his request for time
spent pursuing claims against B. Wilkinson and J. Wilkinson.
5. Blocked Time Entries. Kraatz's counsel created lumped or blocked time
18
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entries that give a total time amount for several separate tasks. This practice makes it
impossible to analyze time spent for specific tasks. Other courts have denied attorney
fee requests when the billing entries do not lend themselves to review of time for
individual tasks. See Case v. Unified School Dist., 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir.
1998). ("Billing entries such as those submitted by plaintiffs, which simply refer to
time spent in 'conference' so not meet these requirements. . . .[that] billed hours were
allocated to specific tasks."); Webb v. James, 967 F.Supp. 320, 324 (N.D. 111. 1997)
(disallowing time entries where "multiple tasks were described for a single block of
billed time—in many of those instances, where it was impossible to estimate an
appropriate sum to subtract, the Court disallowed the entire amount.").

This Court

should disallow the blocked time entries submitted by Kraatz, upholding the policy of
requiring complete and detailed information in order to receive attorney fee awards.
6. Kraatz's First Appeal. Kraatz claims attorney fees solely for the first appeal
of $139,823.50. (Kraatz's Second Brief, p. 5). This amount equals sixty-two percent
(62%) of the total expended at trial by Kraatz ($225,210.36). The amount spent on the
first appeal is grossly excessive.13 The court in Walton, supra, allowed two hours of
attorney time per page for appellate briefs. In this case, Kraatz's appellate briefs,
including his opening brief (64 pages), reply brief (26 pages), and brief opposing
petition for certiorari (20 pages), totaled 110 pages. If Kraatz were allowed two
13

A small but poignant example is the 40.40 hours Kraatz spent to "Assemble
Appendices to Motion." (See Kraatz's Second Brief, p. 11).
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attorney hours for each page at an average hourly rate of $150/hour, he would be
entitled to $33,000 in fees for the first appeal—far less than the $139,000 Kraatz sought
and was awarded.
7. Fee Reduction Based on Transcript Testimony. Kraatz minimally reduced
his fee request based upon transcript pages or trial brief pages. (See Kraatz's Second
Brief, p. 7). Such methods do not accurately correspond to time spent pursuing claims
against B. Wilkinson and J. Wilkinson, individually, or other failed causes of action.
Why should Kraatz be allowed attorney fees for depositions spent pursuing
extracontractual damages like warranty income, Jazz tickets, tennis lessons, Christmas
bonuses, and for time spent pursuing a CPI index, when the contract did not provide
for those damages and the trial court refused to award them.
Kraatz's miniscule reduction method based on pages of transcripts or briefs is
arbitrary, not commensurate with the time spent by Kraatz's counsel pursuing
unsuccessful claims, and is unsupported by any caselaw. Kraatz only reduced his
requested fees by 6.65% where he prevailed on only one of seven causes of action
against one of three defendants and recovered only $124,118.56 in principal after
seeking $3.5 million dollars.
Kraatz reduced his fees against one defendant by one-half of that defendant's
trial transcript pages and based upon counsel's estimate "that 50% of J. Wilkinson's 42
pages of testimony, or 21 pages, which is 3.01% of the total of 697 pages of trial
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transcript, should be excluded." (Id.). The $1,769.70 excluded (3.01% x $58,737.25
in trial preparation and presentation fees) does not recognize nor deduct for the time
spent in discovery or phases other than trial preparation in pursuing unsuccessful claims
against J. Wilkinson. As noted above, only 5 of 17 witnesses Kraatz deposed (29%)
actually testified at trial.

Under Kraatz's new math, no deduction was taken for

unsuccessful claims as to the 12 witnesses who did not testify. The absurdity of this
argument is demonstrated by the fact that counsel for Kraatz only spent 3.22% of their
time actually in trial. (112.60 hours during the week of August 27-30, 1996 (R. 445152) divided by 3,493.60 hours claimed). How can a transcript representing only 3.22%
of counsel's time be used as a basis for any reductions?

POINT V
KRAATZ FAILED TO
PRESERVE ISSUES IN fflS FIRST APPEAL
Kraatz failed to preserve in his first appeal his claims for extracontractual
damages such as Jazz tickets, warranty income, and his daughter's tennis lessons. This
Court remanded "for a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including
reasonable attorney fees." (Memorandum Decision, p. 4) (emphasis supplied). Kraatz
admits his first appeal "addressed only the issue of Heritage's liability for breach of the
express terms of the Contract." (Kraatz's Second Brief, p. 10). If he did not argue for
extracontractual damages in his first appeal, he cannot assert a claim for attorney fees
21
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in pursuing them now. By stating the case was remanded for "damages under the
contract" this Court necessarily, albeit implicitly, rejected Kraatz's request for damages
outside the contract.14
Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 1993) involved the same
procedural scenario as the instant case. Multiple claims were brought in the trial court,
which resolved all of them against the appellant (Husman). The first appeal, however,
did not identify every claim as error. After an initial reversal and fiirther proceedings
in the trial court, a subsequent appeal was taken. In holding "that an appellate court's
reversal must affect only those portions of the judgment from which an appeal is
actually taken," the Wyoming Supreme Court relied upon the doctrine of law of the
case. Id. at 669. It enunciated:
[I]t is the litigant's failure to raise an issue on appeal which gives
rise to the preclusive effect of the lower court's ruling. . . [citation
omitted]. The underlying rationale. . .is that a litigant can argue to
an appellate court only those issues which he raised on appeal. Id.
at 668.
To hold otherwise would create:
the bizarre result of placing an appellant who does not appeal
certain issues in a superior position to one who does and forces the
winning party below to cross-appeal on issues he had won just to
14

Kraatz's citation to Phebus v. Dunford, 198 P.2d 973 (Utah 1948), in support of his
argument for a second bite at the apple, is misplaced. The reversal in Phebus "was
without limitation as to how much of the lower court's decision was set aside." Id. at
974. However, this Court's reversal and remand was with limitation "for a
determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including reasonable attorney
fees." (Memorandum Decision, p. 4) (emphasis added).
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ensure that those issues would not be impliedly reversed. Id. at
669.
See also, Whitlock v. Klamath County School Dist., 91A P.2d 705, 711 (Or. Ct. App.
1999) ("In so remanding, we rejected, albeit implicitly, claimant's 'lack of training'
arguments raised in Whitlock I . . .Accordingly, we reject claimant's second assignment
of error."). Kraatz should not be entitled to attorney fees for chasing extracontractual
damage, tort claims, or accounting adjustments.

CONCLUSION
Kraatz's attorney fee award should be sharply reduced because his causes of
action do not overlap, his fee requests were excessive and unreasonable and because
Kraatz failed to preserve many of the arguments he now makes in his second appeal.
The amount awarded to Kraatz for attorney fees should be reduced to more accurately
reflect the results obtained, to eliminate time spent on unsuccessful claims, as well as
duplicative, unreasonable and excessive time spent by counsel and to reflect his
rejection of settlement offers for more than double the principal sum recovered. Since
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Kraatz's counsel agreed to a one-third contingency fee, his fees should be limited to
$41,372.85 ($124,118.56-M/3).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

-ft

"7

day of October, 2002.

Donald J. Winder, Esq,
Gerry B. Holman, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee and Cross-Appellant

24

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the Reply Brief of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
2002, to:

Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
James A. Boevers, Esq.
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant and Cross-Appellee

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of October,

